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BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Matthew D. Adler+
Any normative framework which has the structure of recommending that
decisionmakers advance certain goals, and that they do so in accordance with decision
theory (DT), runs into the problem of bounded rationality. The problem is how to refine
DT so as to be usable by a bounded decisionmaker -- someone with limited cognitive
resources, for whom the full evaluation of her choices is impossible or at least very
expensive.
This chapter has two aims. The first, pursued in Parts I and II, is to discuss the
problem of bounded rationality in general terms. The second, pursued in Part III, is to
show why the problem creates a gap at the foundations of legal scholarship. In Fairness
versus Welfare (FW), Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell propose a welfarist methodology
for legal scholarship.1 They may be wrong to think that morality is wholly welfarist, but
a normative program which says that social welfare is one of plurality of criteria by
which legal scholars should evaluate laws and policies is very plausible. But we have no
good normative handle on how legal scholars who are bounded in their cognitive abilities
should implement a welfarist or pluralistic program.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY

The term “bounded rationality” is sometimes used by psychologists to describe or
explain certain decisionmaking processes without endorsing or criticizing them. By
contrast, the problem of “bounded rationality” that I discuss in this chapter is normative. I
am interested in the problem that human cognitive limits create for our attempts to flesh
out normative frameworks.
A.

Instrumentalist Normative Frameworks and Decision Theory

A normative framework furnishes recommendations for some class of
decisionmakers. Some normative frameworks furnish moral recommendations, others
non-moral recommendations (for example, recommendations concerning what the
decisionmaker should do in light of her interests). In either event, let us call a normative
framework “instrumentalist” if it is oriented around goals.2 One such framework is
+

Leon Meltzer Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thanks to Christoph Engel, Jeff
Rachlinski, Adrian Vermeule, and Mark White for comments.
1
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 2002, Fairness Versus Welfare, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
2
What exactly this means is a complicated question. Within moral theory, that question has been
extensively discussed with reference to the distinction between “consequentialist” and “nonconsequentialist” moral frameworks. For purposes of this chapter, I don’t need to take a firm stand on the
question. The crucial point is that some such frameworks, such as Humeanism, or welfarism or
consequentialist moral frameworks more generally, are thus oriented and therefore naturally employ DT as
their procedural component -- in turn leading to the problem of bounded rationality.
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“Humeanism,” which recommends to each individual that she pursue whatever
preferences she happens to have. Another is welfarism, a moral framework, which
recommends that decisionmakers promote the goal of social welfare.
An instrumentalist normative framework will not be very helpful unless it
furnishes procedural norms for the decisionmakers within its scope, explaining how they
should go about implementing the stipulated goals. Call these procedural norms the
“procedural component” of the normative theory.
The argument I will be developing in the next two Parts is this: human cognitive
limitations pose serious difficulties for using DT as the procedural component for an
instrumentalist normative framework.
Understood as a set of procedural norms, DT enjoins the decisionmaker to think
of any choice situation at some time t as an outcome set O = {o1, o2, …}, an action set A
= {a1, a2, …}, and a state set S = {s1, s2, …}.3 An outcome is a normatively relevant
description of some way the world might be -- a description in terms of the goals of the
normative theory that DT is fleshing out. Equivalently, an outcome is a proposition or a
set of possible worlds. Actions are what the decisionmaker can do at t.
States, like outcomes, are propositions. But, in a well-framed description of a
choice situation, states are causally independent of actions -- it should not be possible for
an action to cause a state4 -- and so each state is most naturally thought of as a possible
past history of the world, together with causal laws. Further, in a well-framed choice
situation, the states are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. The
decisionmaker does not know which state is the true one -- but one must be, only one can
be, and the decisionmaker knows that. Finally, there are necessary connections between
the states, the actions, and the outcomes, which again the decisionmaker knows. The
conjunction of a state and an action entails one and only one outcome in the outcome set.5

How DT Conceptualizes a Choice Situation
States
s1

s2

s3

3

…

In my discussion of DT, I have relied heavily upon James M. Joyce, 1999, The Foundations of Causal
Decision Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4
See Joyce, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory; James M. Joyce & Allan Gibbard, 1998,”Causal
Decision Theory,” in Salvador Barbera et al eds., Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. 1, Dordrecht: Kluwer,
pp. 627-66.
5
This formulation assumes that the decisionmaker gives zero probability to the possibility of
indeterministic causal laws. Refining DT for the possibility of indeterminism raises complicated issues that
I cannot consider here. See David Lewis, 1981, “Causal Decision Theory,” Australasian J. Philosophy, 69,
pp. 5-30. But it is hard to see why DT, thus refined, would not confront problems of bounded rationality
similar to those discussed below.
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Actions

a1

o(a1, s1)

o(a1, s2)

o(a1, s3)

a2

o(a2, s1)

o(a2, s2)

o(a2, s3)

a3
…

o(a3, s1)

o(a3, s2)

o(a3, s3)

Note: o(ai, sj) is the outcome in the outcome set O that would result if action ai were performed in state sj.

DT also enjoins the decisionmaker to follow certain norms in ranking outcomes
and actions. To begin, the decisionmaker is enjoined to have a complete and transitive
ranking of the outcomes. Another such norm is consequentialism: if, in each state, two
actions produce the very same outcome, then the decisionmaker should be indifferent
between the two actions. Another is dominance: if one action produces no worse
outcomes than a second action in all states, and better outcomes in some, then the first
action must be ranked better.6 Yet another is independence: If two actions produce the
very same outcome o* in some state of the world s', the very same outcome o** in state
s'', and so forth, and are ranked a certain way, then two actions which are identical to the
first pair except that they produce o+ rather than o* in s', o++ rather than o** in s'', and
so forth, should be ranked the same way as the first pair.
DT is sometimes offered, not as a set of procedural norms, but as a set of
substantive criteria for normatively appropriate choice.7 In this guise, the theory takes an
“as if” form. It is agnostic about the procedure decisionmaker actually uses, and instead
says that -- whatever that procedure might be -- he should pick the choices which he
would have selected, had he used DT as his procedure.
I don’t know whether DT, in its substantive version, runs afoul of human
cognitive limits. But, as already stated, any normative framework is incomplete if it
lacks a procedural component. How helpful will it be to state some goal for some agent,
but not tell her what to do to implement the goal? And DT, in its procedural form, clearly
does run afoul of bounded rationality, as I will show in a moment.
But why even think, then, of using DT as the procedural component of a
normative framework? The answer is that DT is far and away the best developed account
of rational choice. DT meshes particularly well with instrumentalist normative
frameworks. A goal is just a norm for identifying a set of outcomes that matter and
ordering its elements. DT then tells the agent how to orient his choices towards these
outcomes, given uncertainty, in a plausible way: by thinking systematically about how his
possible actions and possible prior states might interact to cause different outcomes.
In addition, Leonard Savage showed that the choices of a decisionmaker who
satisfies DT’s norms (and several other more technical axioms) can be represented as
6

More precisely, some of the states in which the first action produces better outcomes must be non-“null,”
i.e., have positive probability.
7
See Frederic Laville, 2000, “Foundations of Procedural Rationality: Cognitive Limits and Decision
Processes,” Economics and Philosophy, 16, pp. 117-138.
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maximizing the expectation of a utility function.8 There is some probability function
assigning numerical probabilities to states, and some utility function assigning numerical
utilities to outcomes, such that the decisionmaker’s ranking of actions corresponds to
their expected utility (where the expected utility of an action is the sum of the utilities of
its possible outcomes, each utility discounted by the probability of the state that, together
with the action, produces that outcome). Reciprocally, if the decisionmaker consciously
maximizes the expectation of a utility function, then she automatically satisfies the
axioms of DT. So it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that DT and expected
utility theory are one and the same account of rational choice.
B.

DT and the Specification of Outcomes, Actions and States

What, then, is the problem of bounded rationality for DT? Humans are
cognitively limited, in various ways. They have limited memories, limited computational
abilities (even when aided by computers), make logical and mathematical errors, and so
forth. But how does this implicate the framework for decisionmaking set forth by DT?
The key difficulty, as I see it, has to do with the specification of outcomes,
actions, and states. The sets of outcomes, actions, and states can be fully specified or
incompletely specified.
Start with outcomes. Remember that an outcome is a proposition or set of possible
worlds. An outcome is “fully specified,” for purposes of some instrumentalist normative
framework, if any two worlds within the outcome are equally good in terms of the goals
of that framework. In other words, a fully specified outcome provides a description of
what might occur which is sufficiently complete that nothing of relevance to the
framework is left out.
Consider, for example, a Humean framework which tells decisionmakers to
maximize their preferences. Imagine that the decisionmaker, Jim, cares only about his
annual income and the number of friends he has each year. Then if a given outcome o
describes Jim’s annual income in each year that he is alive, it is incompletely specified.
If it describes his annual income and the number of his friends, it is fully specified.
A fully specified outcome set is a set of mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive outcomes, each of which is fully specified. A fully specified action set
consists of every possible action the decisionmaker could undertake at the time of choice.
A fully specified state set consists of states which are (again) mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive, and are sufficiently well described to do what state sets are
supposed to do in DT: Each action, together with a state, entails one and only one
outcome in the outcome set.
An unbounded decisionmaker can produce a fully specified state, action, and
outcome set instantly and at zero cost (she can do so “internally” without mental strain
8

For an accessible discussion, see David M. Kreps, 1988, Notes on the Theory of Choice, Westview Press:
Boulder and London.
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and without paying for expensive computers and software). DT is therefore most
plausibly understood as providing the following specification norm for an unbounded
decisionmaker: Use a fully specified outcome, action, and state set. Why is this so?
Consider, first, the unbounded decisionmaker who uses an incompletely specified action
set. In other words, she considers some of the actions that might perform at this moment,
but not all of them. Isn’t this arbitrary? The benefits of adding an action to the set of
actions she already considers is that the new action might be preferable to those she
already considers; the costs (given her unbounded abilities) are nil. So why not consider
it?
Consider, next, the unbounded decisionmaker who uses a fully specified action
set, but an incompletely specified outcome set. Where outcomes are incompletely
specified, the basic norms of DT lose their intuitive plausibility. I will show why this is
so, using the norm of consequentialism. A similar analysis applies to the other basic
norms.
Let us continue with the example of Jim. O' is an incompletely specified
outcome set, where outcomes are described just in terms of Jim’s income, not his friends.
Imagine that Jim reasons in terms of this outcome set; identifies a matching state set
(sufficiently detailed to determine which member of O' would result, for every action he
might perform at present); and ascertains that there are two actions, a and a+, which
result in the very same member of O' in each state. In s1, a results in o* and a+ also
results in o*. In s2, a results in o** and a+ also results in o**. And so forth for every
state. The norm of consequentialism tells Jim to be indifferent between a and a+. But
why should he be? After all, it is possible that - in some states -- a leads to a different
number of friends for Jim than a+. And Jim cares about the size of his group of friends,
not just his annual income. So why should Jim consider a and a+ as equally good, given
that it is costless for him to replace O' with a fully specified set O whose members
specify what happens along both the income and the friendship dimensions, and to think
about his choice in terms of that outcome set?

Consider, finally, an unbounded decisionmaker who uses a fully specified action
and outcome set, but an incompletely specified state set. This could mean two things.
First, it might mean that the state set is insufficiently rich for a conjunction of an action
and a state to always entail one and only one outcome in the outcome set. A choice
situation, thus framed, is one in which the decisionmaker lacks relevant information
about his choice -- and, in the case of the unbounded decisionmaker, this is a pointless
gap, one which he could costlessly rectify through a more detailed consideration of
possible prior histories of the world together with causal laws.9 Second, an incompletely
specified state set might not be exhaustive. Although each member of the action set,
together with each member of the state set, leads to some determinate member of the
outcome set, there is some possible state that the decisionmaker ignores. Were he to

9

Again, this assumes that the decisionmaker gives zero credence to the possibility of indeterminism. See
supra note 5.
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consider that state, he might find that he accords it non-zero probability, and that adding
it to the analysis changes his evaluation of the possible actions. So why not consider it?
C.

Specification and Bounded Decisionmakers

It is therefore quite straightforward to determine the content of DT’s specification
norm, in the case of unbounded decisionmakers. Unbounded decisionmakers should use
fully specified outcome, action, and state sets. The difficulty arises once we allow that it
may be costly or plain impossible for the decisionmaker to produce a fully specified
outcome, action, and state set. What specification norm should DT contain for this sort
of decisionmaker -- a bounded one? The specification norm cannot be: Use fully
specified outcome, action, and state sets. More precisely, given any instrumentalist
normative framework with a sufficiently “rich” goal to generate a very large set of fully
specified outcomes, DT coupled with a full-specification norm will be a highly
implausible candidate to be the procedural component of this framework.
Consider the example of welfarism. For purposes of the general discussion of
bounded rationality, this is simply one example of a normative framework that cannot be
plausibly fleshed out as advising decisionmakers to use a fully specified outcome, action,
and state set. For purposes of the methodology of legal scholarship, as we shall see in
Part III, this is a key example.
Welfarism is really a family of moral theories, which tell the decisionmaker to
aim at some mix of overall well-being and the equitable distribution of well-being. 10 The
most plausible variants of welfarism understand individual well-being as the attainment
of various “objective goods” or (what is essentially the same thing) as the attainment of
those things everyone with full information would converge in preferring. The most
plausible variants of welfarism adopt an impartiality constraint: everyone’s well-being
matters equally, or at least the well-being of everyone within a large population of
interest does (all members of the society, for example). In characterizing outcomes, we
shouldn’t limit ourselves to the well-being of a single dictator or members of a small
oligarchy, and if two outcomes differ only with respect to the identity (proper names) of
individuals attaining particular welfare levels, they should be seen as equally good.
Consider DT as the procedural component of welfarism with an impartiality
constraint and a reasonably extensive list of objective goods. Imagine, for example, a
U.S. governmental official June who attends to the well-being of all current and future
U.S. citizens and considers the following goods: longevity, consumption, health,
happiness, and social relations. June presides over a pollution control agency and, at the
present moment, has the power to regulate some toxin.

10

See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, 2006, “Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and
Legal Applications,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 155, pp. 279-377; Matthew D. Adler & Eric
A. Posner, 2006, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 2561.
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A fully specified outcome set O, for June, would be such that each oi in this set
consists of a list of individuals who are U.S. citizens now or in the future; a consumption
history for each individual, specifying what goods she consumes for every moment she is
alive; a health history for each individual, specifying her health state for every moment
she is alive; a happiness history, specifying her affective states for every moment she is
alive; and a social history, specifying how many friends she has at each moment, what
her social status is, and so forth. A fully specified action set A, for June, would consist of
every possible regulation she might issue to limit the toxin. The outcome (in O)
produced by a given regulation would depend on the causal laws of toxicology (which
determine the direct impacts of the toxin on health and longevity); the laws of economics
(which determine how firms, consumers, and workers will react to a given regulation,
thereby affecting consumption and other items); and the laws of psychology and
sociology (which determine how an individual’s health, longevity, and consumption will
impact his affective states, and how the distribution of consumption and other items
affects social relations). Thus, each state will consist of a combination of a particular
toxicological model, economic model, psychological model, and sociological model, plus
a specification of prior facts relevant to all the models, sufficiently detailed to lead
determinately to one member of O for each member of the action set.
This level of specification massively exceeds the detail about possible regulations,
outcomes, and causal models currently employed by regulators in even the largest and
most deliberate rulemakings.11 I suggest that it would be normatively unwarranted for
June to attempt to follow a full specification norm in implementing her welfarist goals.
The effort might never end and, if it did, would surely consume large amounts of time
and resources. So what is the normatively appropriate procedure for June to follow?
That, as I see it, is the question of bounded rationality, to which DT currently offers no
good answer.
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the problem of providing a procedural
norm that bounded decisionmakers should follow in implementing an instrumentalist
normative framework is unanswerable. “Cognitivists” believe that there are normative
truths and facts. “Noncognitivists” deny this, and think that normativity is at bottom just a
matter of what norms we wish to endorse. Although my sympathies are cognitivist, this
chapter can remain neutral on the issue, because the problem of bounded rationality arises
for both cognitivists and noncognitivists. The cognitivist must decide which normative
framework she believes to be correct and, within that framework, which procedural
component she believes to be correct, given humans’ cognitive limitations. The
noncognitivist must decide which normative framework she wishes to endorse and,
within that framework, which procedural component she wishes to endorse.
How do the cognitivist and noncognitivist settle these issues? Both can, I think,
avail themselves of John Rawls’ method of “reflective equilibrium.” We should decide
what normative framework we believe is correct (the cognitivist spin), or what normative
11

For a discussion of the ways in which cost-benefit analysis and other regulatory decision procedures need
to be -- and, in practice, are -- structured to be sensitive to decision costs and delay costs, see Adler &
Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis, pp. 62-100.
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framework we wish to endorse (the non-cognitivist spin) by striving for an internally
coherent framework that respects (as much as possible) both our pre-equilibrium beliefs
regarding general normative principles or our pre-equilibrium endorsements of such
principles, and our pre-equilibrium intuitions about particular cases. “Solving” the
problem of bounded rationality, for a given instrumentalist framework, means modifying
DT as a procedural norm, or perhaps replacing it with an entirely different kind of norm,
so that the framework now has a procedural component which is acceptable in reflective
equilibrium.
Such a solution may well exist; I do not claim otherwise. Rather, my claim is that
the scholarly literature on decisionmaking has not yet arrived at a solution, or even come
close. Let us now survey current candidate solutions and see where they fall short.
II.

“SOLUTIONS” TO THE PROBLEM OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY?
A.

Uncertainty versus Bounded Rationality

Uncertainty and bounded rationality are distinct problems. Although DT has
solved the problem of providing attractive norms for choice where the only obstacle to
good choice is uncertainty, these features of the view give us zero traction in addressing
bounded rationality.
To see the distinction between uncertainty and bounded rationality, observe that
the decisionmaker with limitless ability to conceptualize actions, states, and outcomes
might be uncertain which state obtains. Indeed, the central contribution of DT is to help
us see what the procedural component of an instrumentalist normative framework
appropriate for partly ideal agents -- ideal in the sense of having limitless mental abilities,
nonideal in the sense of being nonomniscient -- would consist of. In the static case, this
decisionmaker has a fully specified outcome set, a complete and transitive ranking of
outcomes, and a fully specified action set. But she doesn’t know which outcome would,
in fact, result from a given action. So she does just what DT suggests. She asks herself,
how might the history of the world, including causal laws, have proceeded up to this
point? Which outcome would each action map onto, given each such state? And how
strongly do I believe in the various states?
In the dynamic case, this unbounded but nonomniscient decisionmaker is
considering securing more information about the states -- at some cost. For this case, one
well-established aspect of DT -- “value of information analysis” (VOI) --comes into
play.12 The basic idea is that the decisionmaker can use his outcome set and an
appropriately enriched state set13 to evaluate information-seeking actions as much as
other sorts of actions. To see the basic idea in a very simple case, imagine that the
12

On VOI, see, e.g., Robert L. Winkler, 2003, An Introduction to Bayesian Inference and Decision, 2nd ed.,
Gainesville: Probabilistic Publishing, pp. 267-350; Jack Hirshleifer & John G. Riley, 1992,The Analytics of
Uncertainty and Information, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 167-208.
13
That is, a state set sufficiently specified so that each state and each experiment entails one and only one
outcome in the outcome set.
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outcome set has four outcomes, one with utility L(ow), one with utility H(igh), one with
utility L-K, one with utility H-K. There are two ordinary actions, a1 and a2, that the
decisionmaker, Phil, can take: in the first state, s1, a1 leads to the outcome with utility H
and a2 leads to the outcome with utility L. In the second state, s2, it is a2 that produces
the H-utility outcome and a1 that produces the L-utility outcome. Phil gives the first
state a probability of .6 and the second a probability of .4. There is an experiment Phil
can undertake to get better information about which state obtains, at some fixed cost K in
utility. The experiment is action a3. Phil believes that, if s1 obtains, the experiment sends
signal “X” with probability .9 and “Y” with probability .1. If s2 obtains, the experiment
sends signal “Y” with probability .9 and “X” with probability .1. In effect, there are four
states: s1 with a propensity to send signal X, s1 with a propensity to send signal Y, s2 with
a propensity to send signal X, and s2 with a propensity to send signal Y. The probabilities
of these states are, respectively, .54, .06, .04, and .36. This enriched state set (together
with the assumption that Phil would respond to the experiment by updating his beliefs
about the states in a Bayesian fashion, and then choose a1 or a2 using these updated
beliefs) suffices to produce a determinate outcome in the outcome set for each of the
three actions, that is, for the two ordinary actions and the experiment. If K is sufficiently
small and the difference between H and L sufficiently large, the experiment is worth
undertaking --otherwise not.

Value of Information (VOI) Analysis

States
s1
s1
s2
s2
Expected
and signal X and signal Y and signal X and signal Y Utility
if experiment if experiment if experiment if experiment
P= .54

P =.06

P=.04

P=.36

Actions
a1

utility H

utility H

utility L

utility L

.6H +.4L

a2

utility L

utility L

utility H

utility H

.6L+.4H

a3

utility H-K

utility L-K

utility L-K

utility H-K

[.9H + .1L] -K

Phil attaches utility to a3 as follows. He reasons that, if he were to undertake the experiment and the true
state of the world is s1 with a propensity to send signal X, he would receive signal X. He would at that
point update his probabilities in Bayesian fashion and ascribe probability .54/.58 to s1 with a propensity to
send X, 0 to s1 with a propensity to send Y, .04/.58 to s2 with a propensity to send X, and 0 to s2 with a
propensity to send Y. With these new probabilities, he would choose action a1, which leads to utility H-K
in state s1 with a propensity to send X. Similar reasoning allows him to attach utilities to a3 in the other
three states.
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VOI is a very potent tool, but it simply does not address the problem of
specification. It takes as given an outcome set; take as given an action set, one that
includes some “experiments” and other information-gathering measures; and gives
guidance in thinking through how a particular information-gathering measure might be
understood (like an ordinary action) as a distribution across different elements of the
outcome set, producing different outcomes in different states.
Nor does it seem fruitful to try to “adapt” VOI for the task of determining
optimal specification. Consider the problem of optimally specifying an outcome set.
Imagine starting with some underspecified set of outcomes O. Among the actions that the
decisionmaker could take at t are not only ordinary actions a1, a2, and so forth, but also
the deliberative action d of thinking about these ordinary actions using a more fully
specified outcome set O'. So we might imagine a “value of specification” analysis that
marries O with this expanded action set -- in other words, it predicts the effects of
ordinary actions {a1, a2, …} and deliberative action d in the initial outcome set O.
We would need to enrich the state set so that each state, combined with d,
produces one and only one outcome in O. One way to do that is to combine the initial
state set {s1, s2, …}, sufficient for determining the outcomes in O of the ordinary actions,
with statements about what would occur if the decisionmaker were to think about the
ordinary actions with a more refined outcome set O'. So the state set becomes something
like: {s1 and if I were to use outcome set O' in choosing among the ordinary actions I
would pick a1; s1 and if I were to use outcome set O' in choosing among the ordinary
actions I would pick a2; ….. ; s2 and if I were to use outcome set O' in choosing among
the ordinary actions I would pick a1; s2 and if I were to use outcome set O' in choosing
among the ordinary actions I would pick a2; …}. And the decision matrix now looks like
this.

“Value of Specification” Analysis?
Original Choice Situation, with Ordinary Actions
States
Actions
a1
a2

s1

s2

o

o*

o**

o***

…
New Choice Situation, with Ordinary Actions plus Deliberative Action d of
Refining Outcome Set from O to O'.
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States
s1 and
if I were to use O'
to choose among
{a1, a2, …} I would
pick a1

s1 and
…
if I were to use O'
to choose among
{a1, a2, …} I would
pick a2.

s2 and
s2 and
…
if I were to
if I were to use O'
use O' to choose to choose among
among {a1, a2, …}{a1, a2, …} I would
I would pick a1 pick a2.

Actions
a1
o

o

o*

o*

a2

o**

o**

o***

o***

o+

o++

o+++

o++++

.…
d

Every outcome in this matrix is an outcome in the original outcome set O. Note that o+ and o need not be
the same outcome. That is, the outcome in O of simply picking a1 (outcome o) need not be the same as the
outcome in O of picking a1 after deliberating among the ordinary actions using a refined outcome set O'
(outcome o+). Outcome o+ may well reflect the increased deliberational expenses that flow from choosing
d rather than one of the ordinary actions. Similarly, o++ need not be the same outcome in O as o**, o+++
need not be the same outcome as o*, and so on.

Note that this device allows the decisionmaker to consider undertaking action d
and using a more refined outcome set, without actually incurring the costs of doing d. (If
she decides just to undertake one of the ordinary actions {a1, a2, …} rather than doing d,
she never actually chooses among the ordinary actions using the more refined outcome
set.) So this seems like a promising start to the problem of analyzing the value of
refining an outcome set.
But there is a problem. From an initial outcome set O, there may be many
different refinements. Consider our decisionmaker June. She cares about individuals’
well-being, understood to depend on their longevity and moment-to-moment
consumption sequences, health sequences, happiness, and social relations for all moments
individuals are alive. She starts with an outcome set where each outcome specifies
individuals’ longevity and average annual consumption. She could undertake action d1,
which means using a refined outcome set that specifies individual’ moment-to-moment
(rather than annual) consumption; or do d2 and use a different refined set, that specifies
individuals’ annual consumption and average annual health; or do d3 and use yet a
different refined set that specifies individuals’ moment-to-moment consumption and
moment-to-moment happiness; and so forth. There are a very large number of such di.
Considering all of them will be costly for the bounded decisionmaker; but there is
nothing in the VOI framework, either directly or by analogy, which suggests how to limit
the set of deliberative actions d1, d2 … that the decisionmaker considers.
A similar point is that the decisionmaker can start with different outcome sets.
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June might start with ordinary actions {a1, a2, …} and a initial outcome set O that
specifies individuals’ consumption, and from that starting point think about the outcomes
in O of deliberative actions which pick among the ordinary actions using some
refinement of O. Or, June might start with ordinary actions {a1, a2, …} and an initial
outcome set O* that specifies individuals’ happiness, and from that starting point think
about the outcomes in O* of deliberative actions which pick among the ordinary actions
using some refinement of O*. Again, there is nothing in VOI, directly or by analogy,
which helps guide June in determining which outcome set she should start with.

B.

Optimal search

Economists since George Stigler have entertained the notion of optimal search.
Consider the individual who wants to buy a good, has found some willing sellers with
various asking prices, and is trying to decide whether to look for a seller with a lower
asking price, given that the costs of searching are positive. Stigler’s suggestion is that, in
this sort of case, the rational individual searches only if doing so increases expected
utility -- given expected search costs, the probability of finding a seller with a lower
asking price, and the expected benefit of doing so.14
The optimal-search notion seems sensible enough in the case of a decisionmaker
with zero analytic costs but positive costs of “searching” in the sense of making physical
efforts to locate goods. Such a decisionmaker can consider every possible sequence of
bodily movements he might make, every possible choice situation that might eventuate
along each sequence, the choices he would make in each such situation, and the possible
results of each such choice - and then decide whether to initiate some sequence of bodily
movements, as opposed to engaging in an immediate act of consumption, by maximizing
expected utility. It is harder to see how the optimal-search notion is helpful for the
decisionmaker with positive analytic costs.
Consider adapting the notion to the specification of choice sets (where it seems, at
first blush, applicable). How exactly does this work? Building on the discussion in the
previous section, perhaps we might say this. The decisionmaker’s outcome set O is
fixed. He has some initial choice set {a1, a2, …}. There are additional options {x1, x2,
…} not in the initial choice set. Rather than just considering those, he considers a
“choice-set-expansion” choice e. Performing a choice-set-expansion choice such as e
means expanding the initial choice set {a1, a2, …} in some way. For example, e might
mean expanding {a1, a2, …} to {a1, a2, …, x1}. The decisionmaker evaluates the
outcomes of a choice such as e in the outcome set O with an appropriately enriched state
set -- one with conditionals of the form, “were I to consider this expanded choice set, I
would choose this action”.
Analyzing the Value of Expanding a Choice Set

14

See George J. Stigler, 1961, “The Economics of Information,” Journal of Political Economy, 69, pp.
213-225.
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But this procedure is perverse for a decisionmaker with positive analytic costs (at
least absent an intrinsic preference for the very process of decision analysis). The
analytic costs of considering an expansion option e -- the option of supplementing the
initial choice set {a1, a2, …} with some choice x1 -- are greater than just adding x1 to the
choice set without thinking about it and then choosing among {a1, a2, … x1}. In order to
evaluate {a1, a2, …, e}in terms of our fixed outcome set O, the decisionmaker must have
a set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive states sufficiently richly described
so that: each state maps each of the initial actions {a1, a2, …}onto one and only element
of O; each state maps the choice e onto one action in the choice set {a1, a2, … x1}, that
is, each state determines which action in the expanded set the decisionmaker would
choose, were she to expand the set; and, in each state where expanding the choice set
would lead the decisionmaker to choose x1, x1 is mapped onto one and only element of O.
In order to evaluate the choice set {a1, a2, …, x1} in terms of our fixed outcome set O, the
decisionmaker needs a less elaborate state set: she needs a set of mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive states such that each state maps each of the initial actions {a1, a2,
…} onto one and only one element of O, and each state maps x1 onto one and only one
element of O. Simply adding x1 to the choice set without thinking and then choosing
from the expanded set is less analytically laborious than thinking about adding x1 to the
choice set -- so why not just take the first course?
A second and equally serious difficulty for the proposal now under discussion is
this: If we start with some subset {a1, a2, …} of the totality of actions open to the
decisionmaker right now, there are a huge number of choice-set-expansion options e1, e2,
e3, … where each ei expands the initial subset in a different way. And there is nothing in
the optimal-search literature that I am aware of which explains how the bounded
decisionmaker should narrow the choice-set-expansion options being considered -- in
effect, how he should narrow down the set of possible searches, and think about only
some of them.
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C.

Tversky and Kahneman and the “Heuristics and Biases” Program

Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, and co-workers have shown that real-world
individuals are characterized by a variety of “heuristics and biases,”15 and this nowfamous research has, in recent years, generated much legal scholarship, under the banner
of “behavioral law and economics.” One heuristic identified by Tversky and Kahneman,
“prospect theory,” involves a framework for decisionmaking which directly violates DT.
In brief: decisionmakers do not think in terms of the value of outcomes, but rather in
terms of the value of losses and gains relative to some reference point. The value
function for losses is convex, the value function for gains is concave, and the loss
function is steeper than the gain function. Where the possible losses and gains resulting
from a choice are uncertain, individuals do not weight the value of possible losses and
gains by their probabilities, but rather by a weighting function which is an S-shaped
transformation of the probabilities.
A different set of heuristics involve “judgments” rather than choice. These are
processes by which individuals form beliefs -- in particular, processes by which
individuals make probability judgments. The three judgment heuristics originally
identified by Tversky and Kahneman were “representativeness”, “availability”, and
“anchoring and adjustment.” In brief: the representativeness heuristic involves judging
whether some possible state of the world is true, given some data, by focusing on whether
the data is representative of the state. The prior probability of the state is ignored.
“Availability” means ascribing higher probabilities to states whose instances are easier to
recall from memory. “Anchoring and adjustment” means making probability judgments
(or other magnitude estimates) by starting from some initial, arbitrary value.
Sometimes, the heuristics identified by Tversky, Kahneman and their successors
are termed instances of “bounded rationality.” But do these heuristics in fact help solve
the normative problem of “bounded rationality” as I have described it here? To begin, it
should be noted that Tversky, Kahneman and others working in this tradition generally
seem to see the heuristics and biases they identify as departures from rationality -- as
deviations from the true norms of choice, embodied in DT, and the true norms of
judgment, embodied in probability theory.16
To be sure, prospect-theoretic choice, and probability judgments driven by
representativeness, availability, or anchoring and adjustment, could really be part of the
correct procedural component of the correct normative framework, whatever Tversky and
Kahneman think. While that is true, these heuristics are not particularly relevant on the
15

For reviews of this scholarship, see, e.g., Jonathan Baron, 2000, Thinking and Deciding, 3d ed.,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Reid Hastie & Robyn M. Dawes, 2001, Rational Choice in an
Uncertain World, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications; Gideon Keren & Karl H. Teigen, 2004, “Yet
Another Look at the Heuristics and Biases Approach,” in Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey, eds., Blackwell
Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 89-109; Daniel
Kahneman, 2003, “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Bounded Economics,” American
Economic Review, 93, pp. 1449-75.
16
See Gerd Gigerenzer et al., 1999, Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart, New York: Oxford University
Press, pp. 25-29; Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality, p. 1456.
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issue at hand: namely, how to revise DT, and the norm of full specification, so as to be
usable by bounded decisionmakers. Prospect theory is just orthogonal to that question. It
tells the decisionmaker to transform outcomes into losses and gains from a reference
point, and to transform the probabilities of states by an S-shaped function. How to
characterize outcomes in the first place (the problem of specifying an outcome set), and
which actions to consider (the problem of specifying an action set), are not a part of the
theory.
The judgment heuristics, too, give no guidance about how to specify an outcome,
state, or action set. However, these heuristics could be seen as an important adjunct to
DT revised for the bounded decisionmaker. They might be an appropriate way for that
decisionmaker to economize on the analytic costs of assigning probabilities to states, at
least in the case of “small” decisions. But, intuitively, all or at least many instrumentalist
normative frameworks will identify a class of “large” decisions where it would be
unwarranted for the decisionmaker not to think more systematically about her decisions.
(I am pointing to intuitions because, on a reflective-equilibrium account of normative
reasoning, intuitions matter.) The whole apparatus of probability theory and statistics is
a methodology for thinking more systematically about our probability ascriptions.
Consider welfarism. Within the framework of welfarism, aren’t there at least some
decisions -- in particular, governmental decisions to issue statutes or regulations that
govern many individuals -- where the deployment of this apparatus is the right thing to
do?
I will not try to identify this class of “large” decisions more precisely, using
criteria that a bounded decisionmaker could employ. I don’t see how I could do so
except as part of a more general normative account of decisionmaking by bounded actors
-- the very problem that no one has yet managed to solve. But it is implausible, I suggest,
to think that the class is null or small, and thus implausible to take representativeness,
availability, anchoring and adjustment, and similar “quick and dirty” judgment heuristics
as anything like full solutions to the question of how bounded individuals should make
probability ascriptions.
D. Simon and Satisficing
Herbert Simon is the pioneer in normative work on choice by bounded agents.17
He rightly and famously argued that computational costs undermine expected-utility
theory as a general account of rational choice. But -- notwithstanding all the credit
Simon is owed for initiating this field of inquiry -- he did not, I suggest, succeed in
solving the problem of bounded rationality.

17

See generally Herbert Simon, 1982, 1997, Models of Bounded Rationality, Vols. 1-3, Cambridge: MIT
Press; Herbert Simon, 1979, 1989, Models of Thought, Vols. 1-2, New Haven: Yale University Press.
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Simon proposed that bounded agents rationally “satisfice.”18 Satisficing,
generally, means setting a threshold or aspiration level for a choice. Rather than
constructing a full action set, consisting of every option open to her, the decisionmaker
begins to enumerate these options (systematically or not) and chooses the first one that is
“good enough” -- that meets the aspiration level. Satisficing is, therefore, directly
responsive to the problem that constructing a full action set may be infeasible or hugely
expensive for the bounded agent.
But is satisficing a normatively attractive solution to this problem? That depends
on how the aspiration level is set. Some scholars (not Simon) suggest that an aspiration
level might be set in terms of expected utility.19 For this proposal to be workable, we
would need to solve the problem of simplifying the outcome set. Calculating the
expected utility of an action by identifying its possible outcomes in a fully specified
outcome set, developing a matching state set, and then assigning utilities to the outcomes
and probabilities to the states, would be infeasible or at least unwarranted if the fully
specified outcome set is very large. We would also, of course, need to provide a
normatively attractive proposal for setting the aspiration level while economizing on
computation costs (relative to doing DT with a fully specified outcome set). I am not
aware of plausible suggestions on these two fronts.
A different possibility is to set an aspiration level for choices in terms of some
non-utility features of choices -- for example, deciding which house to purchase by
looking for houses until one meets a price cutoff and a size cutoff. But how do we do
this where the impact of choices on the outcomes we care about is uncertain?
Simon, in his original work on satisficing, offered a very simple suggestion. Take
every outcome and make a binary judgment that the outcome is either “satisfactory” (a
value of 1) or “unsatisfactory” (a value of 0). A choice, then, meets the aspiration level
if it has a satisfactory outcome in every state.
This solution (upon examination) leaves untouched the problem of specifying an
outcome set. Are we supposed to consider whether the possible outcomes of an action in
the fully-specified outcome set are always 1 or 0? In many cases, this will be infeasible or
hugely expensive. Reciprocally, once we fix an incompletely specified outcome set
appropriate for the problem at hand, it will sometimes -- for some “large” decisions -- be
appropriate to order these outcomes on some finer scale than a binary scale.
A different solution is to pick certain aspects or dimensions of outcomes that are
relevant to the goals adopted by our normative framework; produce a simplified set of
outcomes that differ with respect to these dimensions; and set an aspiration level for
choice in terms of the expected value of choices with respect to the selected dimensions.
18
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(For example, Fred may care about his income, his living space, his aesthetic experience,
his happiness, and many other things. He focuses just on income and living space; and
decides to bid on a house whose expected cost is no more than $300,000 and whose
expected living space is at least 2000 square feet.) If the simplified outcome set is
sufficiently simplified, this may reduce to a case of choice under certainty. (Fred will, in
fact, know what the contract price and the living space of his house is.)
One difficulty here is identifying the dimensions of outcomes to focus upon.
Intuitively, we want to pick the most “important” dimension -- but identifying that
dimension, while economizing on analytic costs, may prove tricky, as I shall discuss in a
moment. Quite apart from this issue, the variant of satisficing now under consideration
still faces the problem of specifying a non-arbitrary aspiration level.
E.

Gigerenezer, “Take the Best” and Noncompensatory Choice Procedures

A body of recent work on bounded rationality has focused on “noncompensatory”
heuristics. Much of this scholarship has been undertaken by Gerd Gigerenzer,20 who is
notable for his endorsement of heuristics as rational. He sees their use, not as a deviation
from rationality, but as a rational response to computational demands.
Gigerenzer and his co-workers have focused on judgment rather than choice -- in
particular, on prediction tasks -- and have analyzed a heuristic they call “Take the
Best”(TTB). 21 Imagine that there is a population of objects. The individual is given
pairs of objects, and tries to predict which object has a higher value on some criterion.
Each object in the population has a series of k binary cues. The predictor (in the simplest
case) knows whether each object he is presented has a negative or positive value for each
of the k cues, and knows the ecological validity of each cue -- that is, the frequency,
across all pairs of objects where one object has a positive cue value and the other not,
with which the positive value object has the higher criterion value. TTB tells the
individual to follow this procedure in predicting which object in a pair has a higher
criterion value: Order the cues in the order of their validity; if the most valid cue assigns
a positive value to one object and a negative value to the other, choose the first object;
otherwise, move on to the next-most-valid cue and, if that doesn’t differentiate, the next,
ultimately picking randomly between the objects if no cue differentiates.
TTB is a noncompensatory rule in the sense that the information about a pair of
objects provided by a higher-validity cue can never be outweighed by the information
provided by lower-validity cues. Gigerenzer’s research finds TTB to be surprisingly
accurate in a variety of prediction tasks.

20

See Gigerenzer, Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart; Gerd Gigerenzer, 2000, Adaptive Thinking:
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TTB is closely related to noncompensatory choice procedures that other scholars
have studied.22 Much of this work has focused on choice under certainty. Now, there are
multiple choices, not necessarily a pair; the choices have values on k dimensions; the
decisionmaker’s true preference is some weighted sum of the values on the k dimensions.
One sort of noncompensatory procedure in this context is the “lexicographic” rule -- the
analogy of TTB in the prediction context. Order the dimensions by their weights, top to
bottom. Given a choice situation, pick the choice with the highest value on the top
dimension. If there are multiple choices tied for the highest value on the top dimension,
pick among these using the next-top dimension; and so forth. A different, even simpler
noncompensatory procedure is to choose using only the top dimension -- and then pick
randomly among choices tied for the highest value on this dimension.
These ideas, in turn, can be generalized to the case of choice under uncertainty,
and to the case of any instrumentalist normative framework (not just the Humean
framework), along something like the following lines. The goals of the framework define
a fully-specified outcome set. The goals also order the outcomes and allow the
assignment of a utility to each outcome, representing its place in the ordering. Assume,
further, that these utilities are the weighted sum of an outcome’s “subutilities” along k
dimensions or aspects of the outcomes. The top-value rule says this: define a simplified
outcome set, where outcomes differ only with respect to the top dimension. Use a DT
framework, framed in terms of that simplified outcome set, to choose between the
alternatives -- and if actions are equally good in terms of that set, choose randomly. The
lexicographic rule says: Define a simplified outcome set, where outcomes differ only
with respect to the top dimension. Use a DT framework to choose between the
alternatives, using that simplified outcome set. If two or more are tied for best, move on
to the next-best dimension, and frame a DT problem in terms of an outcome set specified
with respect to that dimension. If two or more remain tied for best, move on to the thirdbest dimension to choose between these ….
An initial difficulty with such lexicographic or single-value procedures is that
they do not help with the problem of specifying an action set.
But don’t they at least give us some traction in simplifying the outcome set? One
difficulty is that the utilities which the normative framework assigns to outcomes may not
be representable as the linear sum of k dimensions. The literature on multiattribute utility
theory shows that a linear decomposition of preferences (and, more generally, goals)
presupposes special conditions which are not, plausibly, general requirements of
rationality.23 Absent a linear decomposition, it may not be meaningful to say that one
dimension or aspect of outcomes is weightier than another in terms of the framework. A
different and obvious problem is that, even if the utility numbers that the framework
22
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assigns to fully specified outcomes are linearly decomposable into the sum of weighted
dimensions, the bounded individual may not know what those weights are.
A third and distinct problem is this: Noncompensatory procedures are not
perfectly accurate and, in some environments, may be sufficiently less accurate than
compensatory procedures to be inadvisable. Robin Hogarth and Natalia Karelaia have
undertaken substantial research on the accuracy of noncompensatory prediction and
choice procedures.24 Although the answer is complicated, one important determinant of
whether noncompensatory procedures are much less accurate than compensatory
procedures is (not surprisingly) the true weights of the cues or dimensions. If the true
value or utility of an item is the weighted sum of k cues or dimensions, and if one cue or
dimension has a much larger weight, then a noncompensatory procedure using that cue or
dimension will tend to be quite accurate. If the weights are closer to equal, then a
noncompensatory procedure will tend to be less accurate.
Consider, then, a decisionmaker facing a large choice: one in which, it seems, it is
rational to expend substantial decisional costs to get the decision right. And imagine that
our decisionmaker believes that there is no one dimension of fully specified outcomes
that dominates the others, in terms of the goals she is trying to attain. Imagine, for
example, our official June, who cares about individuals’ well-being, and believes that
well-being is a matter of longevity, consumption, health, happiness, and social relations,
with none taking lexical priority over the others. June is overseeing the issuance of a
major rule, which (she thinks) will change the well-being of many individuals over many
years. June finds that one version of the rule maximizes population attainments with
respect to the dimension of well-being she takes to be most important -- say, health. But
the difference between the best rule and the next best in terms of population health is
small, and June is wondering whether to consider how the rules compare on the other
dimensions. Wouldn’t she be rational to consider that -- at least if the other dimensions
are measurable without huge expense and there is no emergency requiring immediate
issuance of the rule?
In short, while noncompensatory strategies may well be normatively advisable in
an important range of cases -- for small decisions, or where the decisionmaker believes
there is a dominant dimension in the framework’s ordering -- they are more problematic
in others (large decisions without dominant dimensions).
F.

Departing from DT: Dropping the Axioms or Dropping the Structure

DT consists of a certain structure for thinking about decisions, plus a set of norms.
The attractiveness of these norms has been challenged. It has been suggested that the
rational decisionmaker might only have a partial rather than complete ordering of
outcomes.25 It has also been argued (particularly in the context of social choice) that it
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might be appropriate to violate the independence norm.26 Finally, some have even
suggested that violations of transitivity are rational.27
But these discussions are largely orthogonal to the problem of bounded
rationality. As long as the decisionmaker is supposed to think about her choice in terms
of outcomes -- whether or not her ranking of those is supposed to be complete or even
transitive, and whether or not she is supposed to comply with independence -- the
problem remains that we have no good theory for how to simplify the outcome set to
make it tractable for bounded decisionmakers.
A more radical revision of DT would be to change its structure. Might we
develop a procedural component for our normative frameworks that enjoins or permits
the decisionmaker to ignore outcomes entirely (and therefore, also, to ignore states), and
to focus just on her actions? There is a literature on non-instrumentalist approaches to
decisionmaking, which I will not attempt to survey here.28 Such approaches might avoid
or mitigate the problem of bounded human cognitive abilities. But they would sit very
uneasily with instrumentalist normative frameworks, such as welfarism, other
consequentialist moral frameworks, or any other normative framework that is oriented
around some goal. Indeed, they would sit very uneasily with pluralist normative
frameworks, which incorporate both goals and other requirements (e.g., a hybrid moral
view that tells the actor to maximize social welfare within deontological “side
constraints”). Anyone attracted to any instrumentalist or pluralist normative framework
should hesitate to adopt a procedural norm that tells the actor to ignore outcomes.
III.

LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

At this point, the reader is surely growing impatient. What on earth does the
problem of bounded rationality have to do with the methodology of legal scholarship?
The connection is this. The problem of bounded rationality will stymie any
attempt to provide an instrumentalist methodology for prescriptive legal scholarship.
Legal scholarship may be prescriptive, providing recommendations to legislators, judges,
and other legal officials; or it may be nonprescriptive, seeking to describe or explain the
behaviors of various actors. A methodology for legal scholarship furnishes norms for
legal scholars themselves. In the case of prescriptive legal scholarship, it tells legal
scholars how to go about making recommendations to legislators, judges, and other legal
officials. A methodology for prescriptive legal scholarship is instrumentalist if it tells
legal scholars to make those recommendations by determining which laws and policies
maximize some goal.

26

See Adler & Sanchirico, “Inequality and Uncertainty,” pp. 334-50.
See Larry S. Temkin, 1996, “A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity,” Philosophy & Public Affairs,
25, pp. 175-210.
28
See Elijah Millgram, ed., 2001, Varieties of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge: MIT Press.
27

20

If legal scholars were cognitively unbounded, an instrumentalist methodology for
prescriptive legal scholarship would naturally incorporate DT as its guidance for legal
scholars -- with the further guidance, on the crucial issue of specification, that legal
scholars employ fully specified outcome, action, and state sets. It would instruct the
scholar making recommendations to some class of legal officials to consider all possible
actions that the officials might undertake; to evaluate each action with reference to an
outcome set that is fully specified in light of the goal of the methodology; to do so using a
fully specified state set (containing mutually exclusively and collectively exhaustive
states, each of which maps a given action onto a single outcome); and to do so consistent
with the norms of DT, i.e., completeness, transitivity, consequentialism, dominance and
independence.
However, because legal scholars are not cognitively unbounded, it is very
difficulty to say what norms an instrumentalist methodology for prescriptive legal
scholarship should contain on this crucial issue of specification. This is one implication
(among many) of the general analysis presented in Parts I and II. The general problem is
that reflection about appropriate decisionmaking -- by economists, philosophers, decision
theorists, and others who study decisionmaking norms -- has currently reached no point
of reflective equilibrium with respect to how bounded decisionmakers should use the
apparatus of DT.29 The implications of this problem for legal scholarship are that anyone
reflecting on the appropriate methodology for legal scholarship will have difficulty
reaching reflective equilibrium with respect to how legal scholars giving advice to
decisionmakers should use DT to formulate that advice.
It would be absurd to suggest that the implications of bounded rationality for legal
scholarship are its most important or interesting implications. I certainly do not claim
that! Cognitive limitations are a pervasive feature of humans, and thus bounded
rationality is a pervasive problem for attempts to specify normative frameworks for
aspects of human life -- including but hardly limited to legal scholarship. Still, legal
scholars should understand that bounded rationality is a pervasive problem, which will
stymie their own efforts to rationalize their own activities. I do not believe this point has
been sufficiently understood. And it is one worth articulating in a book on the
methodology of law and economics.
I will elaborate the implications of bounded rationality for legal scholarship by
focusing on Fairness versus Welfare (FW). FW is the most sustained attempt, in recent
years, to provide a methodology for prescriptive legal scholarship. Although FW is, to
some extent, addressed to governmental officials, it consists, first and foremost, of
guidance for legal scholars and other policy analysts.
Our object has been to convince legal policy analysts to pursue a research agenda focused
on identifying which legal rules best promote individuals’ well-being … It should be clear … that
our claim concerns legal academics and other policy analysts, not ordinary individuals who must
make decisions in everyday life. … We [also] acknowledge that the problem of government
officials is complicated by the fact that their constituents may not always be able to understand
proper analyses of legal rules (or of many other government policies). Nevertheless, we believe
29
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that responsible government decisionmakers will be able to make better policy decisions if those
who analyze legal policy devote themselves to identifying the effects of legal rules on individuals’
well-being -- that is, if they employ welfare economics rather than base their analysis on notions
of fairness.30

The normative framework that FW adopts is welfarism. FW argues that legal
scholars should identify and recommend the legal rules that advance the goal of social
welfare - meaning the overall well-being of some population of interest but potentially
also the distribution of well-being in the population.31 To put this formally, legal scholars
should identify the legal rules that maximize a “social welfare function”: a utility
function that assigns a utility number to each outcome as a function of individuals’ wellbeing numbers in that outcome, and that does so without reference to the identity of the
individuals (no dictatorship or proper names), and with the understanding that these wellbeing numbers are interpersonally comparable.32 By well-being, FW means the
satisfaction of fully informed preferences.33 FW criticizes the traditional approach to
law-and-economics scholarship, which is to evaluate laws and policies with reference to
wealth-maximization or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.34 FW also famously recommends that
legal scholars should ignore extra-welfarist or “fairness” considerations.
FW, although lengthy, is incomplete. A fully developed welfarist methodology for
prescriptive legal scholarship would have a full procedural component, explaining in
greater detail how scholars should pursue the task of identifying welfare-maximizing
legal rules. 35 But any attempt to do that, I suggest, would run headlong into the problem
of bounded rationality.
The conundrum of a legal scholar, trying to identify the legal rules that maximize
social welfare, is quite analogous to that of our hypothetical welfarist governmental
official June. Just as June needs to somehow narrow down the set of possible legal rules
that she might promulgate, so the scholar must somehow narrow down the set of possible
legal rules that he might investigate. The scholar, like June, wants to evaluate a given
legal rule by considering the different outcomes that the rule might have, depending on
the state of the world -- ignoring non-well-being facts about outcomes and focusing just
on facts about well-being. But, again, an outcome set consisting “just” of outcomes fully
specified with respect to well-being facts would be huge -- given that each individual’s
well-being is multidimensional, and given that social welfare is a function of everyone’s
well-being (not just the well-being of a single dictator). As Kaplow and Shavell explain:
The notion of well-being used in welfare economics is comprehensive in nature. It
incorporates in a positive way everything that an individual might value -- goods and services that
the individual can consume, social and environmental amenities, personally held notions of
30
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fulfillment, sympathetic feelings for others, and so forth. Similarly, an individual’s well-being
reflects in a negative way harms to his or her person and property, costs and inconveniences, and
anything else that the individual might find distasteful. Well-being is not restricted to hedonistic
and materialistic enjoyment or to any other named class of pleasures and pains. 36

Finally, like June, the scholar must somehow whittle down his state set. Policies produce
outcomes (inter alia) by affecting human behavior. So a computationally unbounded
scholar predicting the effect of a given policy on a given set of outcomes would consider
every possible model of human behavior to which he ascribes some nonzero probability - not just the traditional model of expected utility maximization, and prospect theory, but
every alternative. More precisely, if there are N individuals in the population, and a
(presumably very large) finite number M of behavioral models to which he ascribes a
nonzero probability, he should consider every composite model which says that
individual i behaves in accordance with model j -- leading to MN composite models. This
is an overwhelming task for bounded scholars.
As an illustration of the difficulty I am describing, consider optimal tax
scholarship -- the main area in which scholars have explicitly used social welfare
functions to evaluate policies and, on Kaplow and Shavell’s view, the model for
normative legal scholarship.37 James Mirrlees, in his original, Nobel-prize winning work,
sought to determine the optimal income tax schedule, given the following assumptions:
Imagine an economy where individuals have the innate ability to transform working-time
into a single consumption good, which is called income. Each individual’s utility is a numerical
function which depends only on his net income and the quantity of labour he supplies. Thus his
preferences are personal. Individuals are regarded as identical except that they vary in their ability
to supply labor. Thus they can be grouped by productivity types. For the same number of hours
worked, a more able person naturally can produce more income. Each individual decides how
much labour to supply, calculating what will maximize his utility. All these labour supply
decisions taken together determine the output of the economy …. [Government] cannot monitor
the number of working hours a person chooses to work, but can only observe a person’s income.
For this reason the only policy the government can execute is to impose a tax schedule. The
government chooses the income tax schedule which maximizes its social welfare function,
knowing the manner in which individuals of any productivity type will respond. 38

We see, here, a radical simplification in the characterization of outcomes. Well-being is
a function of income and leisure, nothing else. We also see a radical simplification in the
state set. In particular, prospect theory and every other non-expected utility model of
individual behavior are ignored. And a very simplified model of the economy is adopted
(each worker cannot change his productivity, and his wage rate is solely a function of his
productivity). Finally, Mirrlees in his original work ignored the possibility of optimizing
a social welfare function by combining an income tax schedule with other policies.
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These were understandable simplifications. Even a Mirrlees is human and faces
computational limits! The problem is that we lack a persuasive normative account to tell
us whether the simplifications Mirrlees adopted were the right ones -- whether he
simplified too much, or too little, or along the right dimensions.39
Some readers of early drafts of this chapter have been puzzled by my focus, here,
on the bounded rationality of scholars. Isn’t that a secondary or meta-problem? FW
instructs legal scholars to identify the laws and policies that maximize social welfare. In
order to do so, scholars must predict how different laws and policies will affect the wellbeing of individuals in the population. Those effects will depend, inter alia, on the
behavior of legal officials and private citizens. Officials and citizens may have cognitive
limitations, and may deviate from the model of expected utility maximization posited by
traditional economics. Isn’t it this deviation -- not the cognitive limitations of legal
scholars themselves -- that constitutes the primary threat to FW’s welfarist methodology
for legal scholars?
I think not. If legal scholars were unboundedly rational, the fact that non-scholars
-- private citizens or legal officials -- might deviate from expected utility maximization
would not frustrate FW’s program for legal scholarship. In general, DT imposes norms
of rationality on the decisionmaker using DT; but it is agnostic about the nature of the
casual models driving the human actors or nonhuman processes in the decisionmaker’s
environment.40 DT as a framework for prescriptive legal scholarship imposes norms of
rationality on the scholar herself; but it is agnostic about the nature of the causal models
that determine the effects of legal rules, including causal models of the behavior of
individuals and government officials. Unboundedly rational legal scholars using DT’s
state-outcome-action framework could, without difficulty, be sensitive both to the
possibility that some or all citizens and officials might conform to expected utility
maximization, and to the possibility that some or all citizens or officials might fail to
conform. In one (improbable!) state within the state set, all conform; in another state,
none do; in other states, some do and some don’t.
Of course, prescriptive legal scholars are addressing their recommendations to
government officials. But I don’t see why the bounded rationality of the addressees
would stymie FW’s program if the legal scholars themselves were unboundedly rational.
In short, it is the bounded rationality of legal scholars -- not citizens and officials
--- that poses a grave difficulty for FW’s welfarist program for legal scholarship.41
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What are the possible responses to this difficulty? One response, of course, is to
reject FW’s welfarist program for legal scholarship. But this is trickier than it sounds.
Much of the criticism of FW involves its rejection of fairness criteria. If this indeed is a
deficiency in FW, and we correct it by adopting a pluralist program -- recommending that
legal scholars evaluate policies with respect to both social welfare and some set of
fairness criteria -- the problem of bounded rationality remains (at least) with respect to
the welfarist part of this program. A different response is to adopt a wholly non-welfarist
framework, which enjoins legal scholars to focus solely on fairness criteria, or other
nonwelfarist considerations, and ignore overall well-being or the distribution of wellbeing. Such a framework might be easier to square with legal scholars’ cognitive limits,
but it would be normatively unattractive: social welfare is surely one significant part of
the moral landscape. Finally, we might return to the traditional criteria adopted by lawand-economics: wealth maximization or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. But these criteria are
much less attractive (on their own, or as part of a pluralistic framework) than social
welfare as FW understands it. And, in any event, cost-benefit analysis -- the traditional
technique for implementing wealth-maximization or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency -- faces
exactly the same problems of explaining how to simplify action, state, and outcome sets
that the application of a social welfare function does.42
Nor will the problem be solved by shifting away from FW’s preferentialist theory
of well-being. What compounds the problem of bounded rationality is not
preferentialism but multidimensionality. Any theory which recognizes multiple sources
of well-being (be it multiple objective goods, multiple kinds of good mental states, or the
multiple things people prefer), and cares about the well-being of many people, will tend
to generate a particularly large fully specified outcome set.
A different response is to endorse welfarist goals for legal scholars (either solo, or
as part of a larger pluralist program), but to adopt one of the possible solutions to the
problem of bounded rationality discussed in Part II. I have criticized those solutions
already, and will not repeat the criticism here.
Yet another response is to point to the collective nature of legal scholarship. One
might say, “Each legal scholar should try to identify laws and policies that maximize
social welfare. But, in doing so, each scholar should coordinate with other scholars,
rather than acting as if she were the sole researcher pursuing the welfare-maximization
goal.” This leads us into the murky waters of rule-consequentialist revisions to DT.
Rather than asking which policy she should investigate, so as to maximize one or another
social welfare function, the scholar might ask something like the following: what rule for
the community of scholars, if followed by everyone in the community, would maximize
that social welfare function? But, whatever the attractions of rule consequentialism, it
does not seem a fruitful solution to the problem of bounded rationality. There is a large
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set of possible rules to structure the community’s research that might be followed, each to
be evaluated in light of a large set of outcomes and states.
Finally, it might be pointed out some legal scholars are engaged in
nonprescriptive scholarship. They aim, not to recommend laws and policies to
government officials, but simply to describe and explain how individuals behave
(specifically, to understand how individuals respond to legal rules).
There is a clear sense in which descriptive/explanatory legal scholarship does not
need an account of bounded rationality. Imagine that, as a descriptive/explanatory
scholar, I believe that human behavior in some domain is produced by some
computationally cheap heuristic such as those identified by Tversky and Kahneman or
Gigerenzer: availability, representativeness, anchoring and adjustment, Take the Best,
and so forth. I need not take a position about whether this behavior is rational.43 My
aim is not to endorse or criticize the behavior, but to explain it. The heuristic, I claim,
does so. Why do I need to take a position on whether compliance with the heuristic is
normatively appropriate?
A harder question is whether legal scholars engaged in descriptive/explanatory
scholarship confront the problem of bounded rationality in structuring their own research
activities. Will any methodology for nonprescriptive legal scholarship be stymied by the
cognitive limitations of legal scholars? Any such methodology will give guidance to
legal scholars in deciding which questions about human behavior to investigate. Odd as
it may sound, one such methodology -- at least in principle -- is welfarist. That
methodology tells scholars to pursue those research projects into human behavior that
have the greatest expected positive impact on social welfare -- in virtue of the
information the projects might produce, the probability of producing that information,
and the relevance of the information to well-being .44 Such a methodology would, pretty
clearly, be hampered by scholars’ bounded rationality. However, there may be plausible
nonwelfarist accounts of how scholars should undertake descriptive/explanatory work
that are feasibly implemented by bounded scholars.
I will not try to address these questions about the foundations of
descriptive/explanatory legal scholarship. Bounded rationality may not be a gap in the
foundations of descriptive/explanatory scholarship, but it is a large and unresolved gap in
our understanding of how prescriptive legal scholars should conduct their activities.
FW may be right that prescriptive legal scholarship should focus solely on identifying
legal rules that maximize social welfare. At a minimum, it is surely true that social
welfare is one of the criteria that prescriptive legal scholarship should use to evaluate
legal rules. But we currently lack any normative handle on how cognitively limited
scholars should undertake that analysis: on how incomplete action, state, and outcome
sets should be structured so that the analysis is both sufficiently intensive, and yet neither
43
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computationally infeasible nor overly expensive, given the welfare stakes of the rules
being evaluated.
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